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Curiosity and Ignorance
ILHAN INAN
Department of Philosophy, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
Though ignorance is rarely a bliss, awareness of ignorance almost al-
ways is. Had we not been able to develop this powerful skill, there would 
have been no philosophy or science, nor advanced forms of religion, art, 
and technology. Awareness of ignorance, however, is not a motivator; 
but when it arouses curiosity that is strong enough, it causes what may 
be called an “epistemic” desire; a desire to know, to understand, to learn 
or to gain new experiences, which is a basic motivator for inquiry. This 
makes the relationship between curiosity and awareness of ignorance all 
the more important. One can however fi nd very little on this relationship 
within the philosophical literature. In this essay this is what I wish to 
explore. After a brief discussion of the question of whether awareness 
of ignorance is a precondition for curiosity, based on my earlier work 
(The Philosophy of Curiosity, Routledge, 2012) I attempt to show that 
corresponding to the two forms of curiosity that I call “objectual” and 
“propositional”, there are also two forms of ignorance. This will refute 
the prejudice that awareness of ignorance must always have proposi-
tional content and therefore must always be about truth. I further argue 
that awareness of ignorance that does have propositional content can 
be of two different varieties: truth-ignorance versus fact-ignorance. One 
may simply be ignorant of whether a proposition is true or false (truth-
ignorance); one may, on the other hand, know that a proposition is true 
but still be ignorant of the fact that makes it true (fact-ignorance). I 
then show that awareness of ignorance, whether it is objectual or propo-
sitional, can always be translated into what I shall call awareness of 
inostensibility. An important moral to be drawn from this discussion 
is that reaching truth, even when it is coupled with certainty, does not 
always eliminate one’s ignorance and therefore cannot be the ultimate 
goal of inquiry.
Keywords: Curiosity, truth, knowledge, philosophy of curiosity, ig-
no rance, sentence reference, facts, objectual knowledge.
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I.
Ignorance is itself a lack, awareness of ignorance is not, rather it is the 
awareness of that very lack, and is therefore an achievement. If being 
aware, at least in this context, simply means to know, then awareness 
of ignorance must be taken to be a form of second-order knowledge. 
Knowledge of what though? This may appear to have a straight forward 
answer: a proposition. Being aware of your ignorance, on this received 
view, simply is the state of knowing that you do not know a particular 
proposition. Such an oversimplifi ed account would imply that aware-
ness of ignorance is always about truth. I wish to present two separate 
arguments that show that this received view is mistaken. Since both 
of them appeal to certain considerations concerning human curiosity, 
they may be called arguments-from-curiosity. Philosophers in general 
do take the concept of ignorance as being worthy of philosophical inqui-
ry, but the same is unfortunately not the case for the concept of curios-
ity. Therefore I do hope that these arguments will convince some of my 
readers that curiosity is a notion which has philosophical signifi cance. 
The fi rst argument is based on the observation that curiosity does not 
always have propositional content, and the second one, which is per-
haps the more controversial of the two, appeals to the premise that 
even when the content of one’s curiosity is a proposition, it still may 
not be about truth.1 If awareness of ignorance is a precondition for be-
ing curious, then we should expect to have different forms of ignorance 
as well, corresponding to these different forms of curiosity, neither of 
which are about truth.
As a preliminary let me fi rst give a brief summary of the intention-
al-intensional model of curiosity that I developed recently, emphasiz-
ing the role of inostensible conceptualization. The term “curiosity” is 
used in different ways, and it is only one of these uses that this model 
tries to capture. This is the use we give to the term when we make 
utterances such as “Holmes is curious about who the murderer is”, or 
“scientists are curious whether there is liquid water on Mars” etc. Such 
curiosity attributions can always be formulated in language in the 
form of a question: Holmes wishes to answer the question “who is the 
murderer?”, scientists seek the answer to the question “is there liquid 
water on Mars?”. Being curious, in this sense, does not refer to a char-
acter trait, or a drive, nor does it refer to a form of behavior. Rather it 
is a peculiar kind of mental state that all normal human beings enjoy, 
some more and some less, but regardless of their social and educational 
background no person is deprived of it.
Curiosity as a mental state is always about something, and in that 
sense it is an intentional state: Holmes is curious about who the mur-
derer is, scientists are curious about whether there is liquid water on 
1 Though this paper is the fi rst time I deal with the notion of ignorance in detail, 
some of the ideas I will appeal to have been discussed in my earlier published works, 
especially in Inan (2009, 2012 and 2014).
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Mars. Such an intentional mental state has representational content, 
that is the curious mind represents the entity which he or she is curi-
ous about. This form of representation, at least for normal adults who 
have mastered a language, can be expressed in language, and thus 
has conceptual content. Let us put aside the issue of whether there 
can be another form of representation that is not conceptual and does 
not require the mastering of any language, or whether there can be 
conceptual curiosity that is ineffable. Being curious, when it can be 
put into words, may then be said to be intensional. After observing 
the dead body of Smith, if Holmes fi nds suffi cient evidence that Smith 
must have been murdered singlehandedly, he would be in a position 
to construct a concept which can be expressed in terms of a defi nite 
description such as “the murderer of Smith” and come to realize that 
its referent is unknown to him. Such a term is inostensible for Hol-
mes.2 For every instance of curiosity that can be expressed in terms 
of a wh-question there will always be a singular term, mostly in the 
form of a defi nite description, that is inostensible for the curious agent. 
When one is curious about who someone is, then there will be a de-
scription that purports to refer to an unknown person; when one is 
curious about where something is there will be a description that re-
fers to an unknown location; when one is curious about why something 
happened, there will be a description that refers to an unknown cause 
etc. This is objectual curiosity. There is then curiosity whose content 
is given by a full sentence which expresses a specifi c proposition in 
the appropriate context. This is what I call propositional curiosity. The 
typical form of it is captured by a whether-question. For scientists to 
be curious about whether there is liquid water on Mars, they must be 
in a position to construct a full proposition which can be expressed by 
a sentence such as “there is liquid water on Mars” and seek to know 
whether it expresses a truth or a falsity. Such a sentence would then be 
inostensible in their idiolects. Following Frege, if we take declarative 
sentences to be referring expressions whose referents are one of the 
two truth values, then we could conclude in this case that scientists do 
not know to which of these values the sentence refers. We may, on the 
other hand, countenance a different kind of referent for a declarative 
sentence, for instance a proposition, or a state of affairs, or a fact. We 
may also completely deny that sentences are referring expressions. For 
every such position we will have to give a different account of curiosity 
whose content is expressible by a full declarative sentence and there-
fore has propositional content. Regardless of what kind of semantic and 
2 The notion of “inostensible” is a made-up term. Though I usually refrain from 
giving a strict defi nition it, loosely we may say that a term is inostensible in the 
idiolect of a speaker just in case the subject does not know its referent; if the subject 
does know the referent then the term is ostensible. The distinction is one that admits 
of degrees: the more experience you have with the referent of a term, the more 
ostensible or the less inostensible that term will become, though if it still has the 
potential to arouse your curiosity, it would still be on the inostensible side of the scale.
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syntactic account we adopt for sentences, the intentional-intensional 
model will work, though not in the same way. Suffi ce it to say for now 
that curiosity that has propositional content would involve a full de-
clarative sentence which is inostensible for the curious agent, and that 
their curiosity is about something—making it intentional— and it has 
propositional content—making it intensional.
II.
How curiosity and ignorance relate to one another is a question that 
is not as easy as it may fi rst appear. Perhaps the most basic question 
that can be raised concerning this is whether awareness of ignorance 
is a precondition for curiosity. If I were to ask you to give me an ex-
ample of something that you are curious about now, it would be quite 
diffi cult, perhaps even impossible, for you to provide me with such an 
example while denying that your curiosity is caused by your awareness 
of ignorance. If Holmes is curious about who the murderer is, he must 
be aware of his ignorance about who the murderer is, and if scientists 
are curious about whether there is liquid water on Mars, then they 
must be aware that they do not know whether there is liquid water 
on Mars. Even if one denies that awareness of ignorance is always re-
quired to become curious, it seems that we can easily agree that in an 
overwhelming number of cases our curiosity is caused by our aware-
ness of ignorance.
Now it should be obvious that awareness of ignorance does not al-
ways arouse curiosity. In other words, the simple entertainment of an 
inostensible concept or a full proposition in one’s mind does not by itself 
arouse curiosity. As you read the daily newspaper for instance, there 
may be many inostensible terms that you come across. Suppose you 
notice that in the headlines on the front page it says “the head of UEFA 
under investigation”; now it may very well be the case that you do not 
know who the head of UEFA is, and you may at that instant become 
aware of your ignorance of this, that is you may come to realize that the 
term “the head of UEFA” is inostensible for you. You may further come 
to realize that you do not know what the head of UEFA is being charged 
of, what evidence there is for the charge, whether he is being framed, 
etc. There will be various inostensible terms whose inostensibility you 
can come to realize with little effort. If, however, you are not interested 
in sports politics, you may not be bothered to read the relevant article 
to fi nd out who is being charged of what. For others who have more 
interest in such issues, that simple phrase in the headlines may arouse 
curiosity.
Awareness of insotensibility only when it is coupled with interest 
is what arouses curiosity. Curiosity, in this sense, is interest-relative. 
Curiosity in effect predominantly causes an epistemic desire. Now that 
epistemic desire, for objectual curiosity, may be expressed as a desire 
to know the referent of one’s insotensible term, and it can never be ex-
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pressed as a desire to know the truth value of a proposition. If you are 
curious as to who the head of UEFA is, then it should normally follow 
that you do not know the referent of the term “the head of UEFA”; it is 
your awareness of your ignorance of this plus your interest in the topic 
that arouses your curiosity. And if your curiosity is strong enough, then 
that may motivate you to develop a desire to turn the page to read the 
article. Here the epistemic desire caused by curiosity would always be 
expressible as a desire to fi nd the referent of a defi nite description: the 
head of UEFA, the charge against the head of UEFA, the cause of the 
charge against the head of UEFA etc.
This of course does not imply that curiosity is always caused by 
awareness of ignorance. Whether there can be curiosity without aware-
ness of ignorance is a question that is philosophically interesting since 
it relates to the more general question of whether a second-order epis-
temic attitude, such as awareness of ignorance, is a necessary condition 
for being curious. If it is, then it could turn out that we have been mis-
taken in attributing curiosity to animals and pre-language children. 
Despite the fact that they exhibit what appears to be inquisitive and 
exploratory behavior form the outside, on this view, it would not be cor-
rect to claim that animals and young children enjoy the mental state 
of being curious assuming that they do not have the capacity to form 
second-order epistemic attitudes. One reason for this may be that they 
do not possess higher-order concepts such as knowledge or truth.3
Perhaps an argument can be given on the other side. Consider a 
primitive caveman who has not mastered a language yet. Suppose he 
has produced a tool that we might today call an “axe”. One day he loses 
his axe. Can he become curious where his axe is? Though he has no 
higher-order concepts such as knowledge or truth, he may have ways 
of representing his axe, perhaps not under a general artefactual kind 
concept, but simply as a particular, and he may also have the skills to 
represent locations. With some minimal syntax he may have acquired 
the means to combine them to form a representation such as the loca-
tion of Axe. Given his interests within the particular context that he is 
in, the simple entertainment of such an inostensible notion may cause 
suffi cient mental irritation for him to become curious and in effect to 
develop the motivation to fi nd his axe. Such mental irritation need not 
3 Kvanvig (2003: 145–146) raises a similar question: if curiosity is a desire to know, 
then how can a being who does not have the concept of knowledge or truth be curious? 
Here the emphasis is on whether children and animals can have these concepts rather 
than whether they can become aware of their ignorance by forming second-order 
attitudes. Now it seems Kvanvig does not wish to give up the idea that children and 
animals are in fact curious beings, so he concludes that a curious being need not have 
the concept of knowledge or truth; all that is needed is to have the ability to desire 
to “ascertain that p or not-p”. As I shall argue this cannot be the case for objectual 
curiosity, and can only be correct for only one form of propositional curiosity.
290 I. Inan: Curiosity and Ignorance
require him to refl ect on his ignorance and to become aware of it.4 If so, 
it would be wrong to attribute an epistemic desire to our primitive man. 
He is neither aware of his ignorance, nor does he seek knowledge. All 
that can be said is that he desires to fi nd his axe. Some may prefer to 
call this “proto-curiosity”. Animals and infants may have it too. As long 
as there is inostensible representation there can be curiosity at this 
primitive level without any awareness of ignorance. There is no doubt 
a lot more to be said on this issue but let us now concentrate solely on 
curiosity that is caused by our awareness of ignorance.
III.
To my knowledge within the scarce philosophical literature on curios-
ity the distinction between objectual and propositional curiosity has 
been explicitly formulated only recently.5 The fact that contemporary 
epistemology concentrates so much on propositional knowledge while 
sparing so little attention to objectual knowledge, or other such objec-
tual epistemic verbs, is one good indicator that most philosophers tend 
to deplore the use of such objectual-talk. This strong trend appears to 
have dominated not just epistemology but other sub-disciplines within 
contemporary philosophy as well. In order to understand the nature of 
curiosity, I believe, we have to overcome our propositional-bias.
As I stressed being curious about whether such-and-such is the case, 
is different from being curious about who someone is, or where some-
thing is, or what something is etc. Only in the former type of curiosity 
can we isolate a full proposition whose truth value is being sought. Now 
one reason why it may appear as if curiosity as well as ignorance must 
always have propositional content is because it appears that what sat-
isfi es curiosity and eliminates ignorance can always result from the ac-
quisition of some piece of propositional knowledge. If Jones is the mur-
derer, and Holmes comes to know this, then Holmes’ curiosity about 
who the murderer could be satisfi ed. Just because the acquisition of 
the knowledge of a proposition satisfi es one’s curiosity and eliminates 
one’s ignorance, it does not follow that the curiosity and the ignorance 
4 Depending on what we take concepts to be, we may even wish to conclude that 
such a primitive form of representation is not conceptual.
5 I discuss the distinction between propositional and objectual curiosity in Inan 
(2012). In earlier work Kvanvig (2003) addresses philosophical issues on curiosity (see 
footnote 3), but fails to makes this distinction despite the fact that he distinguishes 
between objectual and propositional knowledge as well as understanding. In later 
work Kvanvig (2012) appears to endorse the view that the goal of curiosity is 
objectual understanding. One of the early contributors to the literature on curiosity 
is Miščević (2007), who has just recently published an excellent article (Miščević 
2016) in which he makes a taxonomy of the different forms of curiosity which include 
the propositional and objectual distinction. Though Russell never philosophized on 
curiosity, given the emphasis he gave on the distinction between knowledge of things 
and knowledge of truths (see Russell 1910) he had all the resources to distinguish 
between two corresponding forms of curiosity.
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in question were also propositional. The acquisition of propositional 
knowledge, if it is rich enough, may satisfy various curiosities and ig-
norances. Had Holmes initially been curious about whether Jones is 
the murderer, then this curiosity of his would also have been satisfi ed, 
but quite obviously being curious about who the murderer is, is not the 
same thing as being curious about whether Jones is the murderer.
Now it should be expected that the content of one’s curiosity and 
the content of one’s ignorance are identical. This is a very common-
sensical view, so much so that it may not even require any argument 
for it. Nonetheless it is important to have it on paper so that we can 
draw certain conclusions from it that may not be obvious at all. Now a 
further thesis that intuitively connects curiosity with ignorance is that 
they must be directed toward the same thing, that is if one is curious 
about something, then their ignorance of which they are aware that 
causes their curiosity must also be about the very same thing. From 
these innocent-looking truisms what follows is that if one’s curiosity 
has propositional content then so does their ignorance, and if one’s cu-
riosity does not have propositional content then neither does their ig-
norance, and perhaps more importantly, if one’s curiosity is not about 
truth then neither is their ignorance.
Going back to the Mars-example, if scientists are curious whether 
there is water on Mars, then they do not know whether there is water 
on Mars, and it is the awareness of their ignorance of this that (par-
tially) causes them to be curious. Now one may think that when the 
content of curiosity is a proposition there is not much more interesting 
philosophy left. In fact there is. But before we get to that let us con-
centrate on the awareness of ignorance involved in objectual curiosity.
If Holmes is curious about who murdered Smith, and if his curios-
ity is (partially) caused by his awareness of ignorance, then it seems 
quite clear that he must have been aware of his ignorance about who 
murdered Smith. Now what appears to be a truism has an implication 
which is, by no means, a truism—based on the Russellian principle 
that what follows from what is obvious is not always obvious. The con-
tent of Holmes’ curiosity in this case is not a proposition, and if not, nei-
ther is the content of his ignorance. Holmes’ awareness of ignorance in 
this case simply translates into a second- order knowledge attribution: 
Holmes knows that he does not know who the murderer is. It is clear 
that there is no proposition here that can be singled out whose truth 
value Holmes is unaware of. This is why it is important to recognize 
that the inostensible term involved in such cases is always a defi nite 
description—rather than a full sentence—that refers to some unknown 
entity relative to the curious subject. This is the case for all instances 
of curiosity that can be posed by wh-questions. If I am curious about 
where my house keys are, what is unknown to me is captured by the 
defi nite description the location of my house keys which is exactly what 
makes this term inostensible. What I do not know is the referent of this 
term; it is not the truth value of a proposition. If we do not know why di-
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nosaurs became extinct, then what is inostensible for us is the defi nite 
description the cause of dinosaur’s becoming extinct; what is unknown 
is to what series of events to which this term refers, it is again not 
whether a proposition is true or false. Of course in each and every case 
in which there is awareness of objectual ignorance we will also come 
across instances of awareness of propositional ignorance. If you know 
that you do not know why dinosaurs became extinct, perhaps you also 
know that you do not know whether it was a meteorite that caused it, 
given that this is a popular hypothesis which you may have heard of. 
If you have a skeptical bent, you may even say that you do not know 
whether dinosaurs have in fact become extinct, or whether there have 
in fact ever lived a species as such. These will be examples of proposi-
tional ignorance, but none of them will be identical with the curiosity 
and your ignorance concerning why dinosaurs became extinct. Objectu-
al ignorance can only be expressed in terms of an epistemic verb which 
is also objectual. In general, we report such ignorance—as I have been 
doing all along—by using the verb to know in its objectual form, usually 
followed by a question word: not knowing who someone is; not knowing 
where something is; not knowing why something happened; not know-
ing when something took place; not knowing how something happened; 
not knowing what something is. Now some may feel concerned about 
the fact that the ordinary use of such locutions such as knowing-who is 
context-sensitive. The fact that our common linguistic practice of using 
question-words is highly context-dependent should not be a worry for 
anything I say here. First as I have argued in length that what has led 
philosophers to claim that such notions are context-sensitive is because 
of the fact that it is common linguistic practice to use these notions el-
liptically for longer descriptions.
As Quine famously noted when you ask who someone is, sometimes 
you have the face and you want the name, and sometimes you have the 
name you want the face etc.6 Granted that this is correct, the notion of 
knowing-who should have some strict use in which it is not elliptical for 
anything longer.7 In any case even if knowing-who is always elliptical 
for something longer, in most of those cases when you spell it out you 
shall see that you do not get a full proposition. When you ask “who is 
that man?” and all that you wish to know is the guy’s name, then what 
you are curious about is what the name of the man is, and what you 
are ignorant of is the name of the man. In fact, once we paraphrase 
the question so that it captures your intent, the question word “who” 
drops, and we are left only with “what”—which really is the queen of 
all question words. If, as the host of a party you see an uninvited guest, 
and ask “who is that man?”, you may simply be expressing your curios-
6 Quine in his classic piece (1956) emphasized the philosophical distinction 
between de re and de dicto attitudes, but later rejected it in his (1979) because of 
his conviction that notions such as knowing who are utterly context-dependent and 
interest-relative.
7 For a more detailed discussion of this see Inan (2012: 45–46).
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ity as to why he is at the party, or who invited him etc. For each and 
every such case, assuming that the speaker knows what he wants to 
ask, then we can always fi nd a defi nite description whose referent he 
or she is seeking.
Perhaps a stronger reason why the context-sensitivity of the use of 
question words should not worry us is because they are in fact dispens-
able luxuries that can be eliminated from language without signifi cant 
loss. Every wh-question can be translated into a defi nite description 
with a question mark at the end. “Who murdered Smith?” translates as 
“the murderer of Smith?”, “where are my keys?” translates as “the loca-
tion of my keys?” This is also the case even for what-questions. “What 
is the 98th prime number?” translates as “the 98th prime number?”. For 
philosophical question such as “what is virtue?” the translation will 
depend on what it is we wish to ask. It could simply be “virtue?” if we 
take this term to be leaned towards the inostensible, otherwise it will 
be elliptical for something longer, such as “the necessary and suffi cient 
condition for being virtuous?”, or “the nature of virtue?”, “the essence of 
virtue”.8 The same is true of reports of objectual ignorance. Rather than 
saying “I do not know where my keys are”, I can say “I do not know 
the location of my keys”. Similarly, “I do not know who the president 
of Rwanda is” translates as “I do not know the president of Rwanda”; 
“I do not know why dinosaurs became extinct” as “I do not know the 
cause of dinosaurs having become extinct”; “I do not know what virtue 
is” as “I do not know virtue” or “I do not know the nature of virtue” etc. 
In all these cases there is a defi nite description that is inostensible 
for the subject who is aware of his or her ignorance. If I do not know 
where my keys are, then “the location of my keys” is inostensible for 
me, given that I do not know its referent. As far as my ignorance goes it 
is irrelevant whether I have a hypothesis concerning what the referent 
of the term is. If, for instance, I entertain the idea that I may have left 
my keys in my offi ce, then there is a full proposition whose truth value 
is unknown to me: my house keys are in my offi ce. This proposition is 
also inostensible for me given that I do not know whether it is true or 
false, and thus I may be aware of my ignorance of it. This however is 
not the same ignorance as in the initial case. Being aware of my igno-
rance about where my keys are, is not the same thing as being aware 
of my ignorance about whether my keys are in my offi ce. If I were to 
fi nd out that my keys are not in my offi ce, I would no longer be ignorant 
whether they are there, but that would not eliminate my ignorance 
about where the keys are. The proposition that my keys are in my offi ce 
would then be ostensible, given that I would then know that it is false, 
but the description “the location of my keys” would still be inostensible. 
If, on the other hand, I were to fi nd out that my keys are in fact in my 
offi ce, then not only the proposition, but also the defi nite description 
8 See Inan (2012), Chapter 1: Meno’s Paradox and Inostensible Conceptualization, 
especially p. 27–28
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will become ostensible. The fact that by eliminating my propositional 
ignorance I thereby eliminate my objectual ignorance by no means im-
plies that the two are identical.
Now another philosophical worry concerning epistemic verbs that 
are objectual is that they are in general fuzzy notions that do not have 
sharp boundaries. There is no strict criterion to determine what it takes 
to know someone, or to know a city, or to know the cause of something. 
This is exactly what makes such notions gradable, allowing for degrees. 
We may both know the same person, though you may know her better 
than I do. This is perhaps one reason why epistemologists have the 
propositional bias, since propositional knowledge does not appear to 
be gradable, and that may be taken to be an advantage. If this is the 
main reason why they think that, then we ought to refrain from using 
objectual epistemic verbs in doing philosophy as much as possible: we 
should ban not only the use of knowledge in its objectual sense, but also 
other epistemic notions such as acquaintance, experience, understand-
ing, familiarity, which all have objectual uses. This will simply result 
in the impoverishment of language.
Furthermore, as I shall argue in the next section, the distinction 
between ostensible and inostensible propositional knowledge reveals 
that it could also come in degrees. Just like objectual curiosity we may 
now give an account of awareness of objectual ignorance by appealing 
to the notion of inostensible reference. Being aware your ignorance of 
the F is to be aware that you do not know the F, and in linguistic terms 
that simply implies that you are aware that you do not know the refer-
ent of “the F”, in other words, “the F” is a term that is inostensible in 
your idiolect.
IV.
On the surface it may appear as if the awareness of ignorance, and the 
curiosity which it leads to, is a lot easier to deal with when they have 
propositional content. One may say that in such instances there is a 
full proposition in question, and the agent is aware of their ignorance 
of whether that proposition is true or false, and this causes them to 
become curious, and once they fi nd out whether the proposition is true 
or false, then their curiosity is sated. In order to see that this is not 
the whole story, we need to deal with how our sentences, when they 
express truths, relate to reality. Given that truth is notoriously a dif-
fi cult and controversial notion, it is not easy here to give an account of 
propositional ignorance and curiosity on neutral grounds. I will fi rst, 
in very brief terms, sketch the theory of truth that I fi nd to be most 
appealing. This will allow me to formulate a distinction between two 
forms of propositional curiosity and ignorance that will be central to 
my main thesis. The distinction however can be made on the basis of 
an alternative theory of truth, and so I am hoping that even if you fi nd 
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my theory of truth to be problematic, you may nonetheless appreciate 
the distinction.9
Let us assume that Frege was right in his conviction that declara-
tive sentences are referring expressions, but let us further suppose that 
Frege was wrong in his conviction that sentences refer to one of the 
two peculiar objects which he called the True and the False. A far more 
intuitive alternative is to take a sentence that expresses a truth to re-
fer to a fact. For a simple sentence in the subject/predicate form a is F, 
when it expresses a truth, we may simply take it to refer to the fact of 
a’s being F which may be said to be specifi cally the fact that makes the 
sentence true. When a sentence expresses a falsity, let us then assume 
that the sentence fails to refer to a fact. The sentence “the earth is 
round” expresses a truth in virtue of referring to the fact of the earth’s 
being round. The sentence “the earth is fl at” on the other hand, pur-
ports to refer to the fact of the earth’s being fl at, but given that there 
is no such fact, it fails to refer. Suppose that, contra Frege, we endorse 
such a theory which reduces truth to a form of reference and falsity to 
a form of failure of reference for sentences. If we were to further give 
an account of propositional truth and falsity, we could then say that a 
proposition in the form a is F is true just in case its referent is the fact 
of a’s being F, and is false if there is no such fact. Now under this theory 
we can distinguish between two different ways in which a full sentence 
can be inostensible in the idiolect of a speaker.
To do this we should fi rst raise the question what it means for a 
subject to know a proposition under this theory. The received view 
tells us that if a subject grasps a proposition and knows that it is true, 
then the subject knows the proposition. Now under the theory of truth 
that we are considering to know that a proposition is true is to have 
a sentence in one’s idiolect that expresses that proposition, to be in 
position to grasp that proposition, and then to know that the sentence 
that expresses the proposition refers to a fact. Briefl y knowing that a 
sentence expresses a truth, is to know that it refers. This by itself does 
not say what epistemic connection the subject has to the referent of the 
sentence. In particular knowing that a sentence expresses a truth does 
not necessarily imply that that the subject knows the fact to which it 
refers. So there appears to be a distinction between knowing that a 
sentence refers to a fact versus knowing the fact to which a sentence 
refers. This is a distinction that applies not just to sentences, but to all 
9 I discuss this theory in detail in my Truth As Reference and Falsity As Failure 
(unpublished manuscript under consideration). In the text I have given an extremely 
rough sketch of it, which may make it sound as if I am ignoring certain well-known 
problems concerning fact-ontology. Let me just note briefl y that I deny that there are 
negative-facts, conditional-facts, disjunctive-facts, even existential-facts. Sentences 
involving such logical operators, when they express truths, refer to what I call 
content-states (which are not empirical facts.) I also do not presuppose that there 
are facts that are language and mind independent. For brevity’s sake I do not go into 
any of this in the text.
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referring expressions, which forms the basis of the distinction between 
ostensible versus insotensible reference. The philosophical signifi cance 
of this distinction can perhaps best be appreciated when we consider 
how it applies to defi nite descriptions. There is a distinction between 
knowing that a defi nite description refers to an object versus know-
ing the object to which that defi nite description refers. You may for 
instance know that the defi nite description “the maternal grandfather 
of Socrates” refers to a person without knowing anything about that 
person except for whatever follows from the description. The point is 
that even when you know that a term refers, the term may still be inos-
tensible for you. Now the question is whether the same can also happen 
in the case of full declarative sentences.
Sentential reference has its own peculiarities. There is an important 
difference between how a sentence relates to its referent, as opposed 
to how a defi nite description relates to its referent. The difference has 
to do with compositionality. The referent of a defi nite description is 
normally not an entity that is composed of the referents of the parts 
of the defi nite description. For instance, the description “the capital of 
Rwanda” refers to a city; the referents of the parts of the description 
includes a country (Rwanda) and a descriptional function (the capital 
of x), neither of which is a part of the city referred by the description. 
Under the theory of truth we are considering compositionality liter-
ally does apply to sentences. The sentence “the earth is round” refers 
to a fact that is composed of the earth—which is the referent of the 
subject term of the sentence—and the property of being round—which 
is the referent of the predicate term of the sentence. Only for some 
very special cases of defi nite descriptions can we get compositionality. 
The most obvious examples would be the nominalizations of sentences: 
“the earth’s being round”, for instance, refers to a fact whose constitu-
ents include the referents of the parts of that description. But normally 
defi nite descriptions do not abide with compositionality for reference. 
That is why we can easily make the distinction between a defi nite de-
scription being ostensible or inostensible in the idiolect of a speaker. 
When you grasp a defi nite description, and you know the referents of 
the parts of that description, this does not automatically put you in 
epistemic contact with the referent of that description. That is because 
the referent of the description is not an entity that is composed of the 
referents of its parts. Even if you are familiar with the referents of its 
parts, you may not be familiar with the referent of the whole descrip-
tion. Consider the description “the largest lake in Brussels”; now it 
may very well be the case that you do not know its referent, but that 
does not imply that there is a part of the description whose referent 
is unknown to you. Similarly, you may not know what the 98th prime 
number is, even if you know the referents of the parts of the description 
to refer to that unknown number. Given that compositionality holds for 
sentences, how could it be possible to grasp a sentence, know that it is 
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true, but still be ignorant of its referent? Now the typical way in which 
this could happen is when such a sentence contains a term that is in-
ostensible for the subject. For instance, it would take little effort for 
you to know that Socrates’ mother gave birth to Socrates. What do you 
know about Socrates’ mother? If all that you know about her is what-
ever follows from the description you use to refer to her, together with 
what you can deduce from your background knowledge about mothers 
etc., then it should be very little. Now we have no problem grasping the 
proposition expressed by the sentence “Socrates’ mother gave birth to 
Socrates”, and we could easily come to know that it is true, however 
we may have very little knowledge of the fact to which it refers. That 
fact concerns a certain individual’s having a certain property, it is the 
fact of Socrates’ mother having given birth to Socrates. Such a fact may 
also be taken to be an event; the event of a certain female deliver-
ing a baby. If you have little knowledge of this female, then you have 
a very low degree of acquaintance with this event. On the epistemic 
scale your contact with this fact is on the far side of inostensibility, this 
however, does not prevent you from knowing that the fact exists. I call 
such knowledge inostensible; to gain ostensible knowledge of the same 
proposition you would need to become more acquainted with the fact 
that makes it true.
There are many truths we claim to know though we rarely fi nd the 
motivation to refl ect on our ignorance concerning the facts to which 
they correspond. Recently I read on the NASA website that they 
discovered a new earth-like planet. They named it “Kepler-186f”. If 
NASA website is a reliable source of information, and if what they say 
is true, then I could now be said to know that Kepler-186f is a plan-
et. This is a typical case of knowledge by testimony. But then I ask 
myself: what do I know about Kepler-186f? From the naming system 
NASA employs I can deduce that it is a planet that revolves around 
a star called “Kepler-186”, and that it is the 6th object discovered so 
far that revolves around it (hence the subscript “f”). I also know now 
that Kepler-186f is close in size to earth, and that is why its discovery 
made it into the headlines. Other than that I know close to nothing 
about this distant planet. I do not know where in our galaxy it is, what 
its sun is like, what kind of atmosphere it has, what the color of sky 
would look like on a sunny day, whether there are oceans on it, etc. 
My epistemic connection to this planet is remote enough to make the 
name inostensible in my idiolect. When I further consider my knowl-
edge of the proposition that Kepler-186f is a planet, with little refl ec-
tion I could come to realize how little I know the fact that makes it 
true; namely the fact of Kepler-186f’s being a planet. Given that a part 
of the sentence that expresses the proposition leans towards the inos-
tensible, then the same is also the case for the full sentence. I know 
that the sentence refers to a fact, but I have little acquaintance with 
that fact. I am not ignorant of the truth of the proposition, but I am 
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quite ignorant of the fact that makes it true. This is why my knowl-
edge of the proposition in question is leaned towards the inostensible, 
allowing me to be curious about it.
At times not just the subject term, but also the predicate term in a 
sentence may be inostensible for one, even if they know the proposition 
expressed by it is true. Consider the following case, which is perhaps 
a bit artifi cial, but it makes the point. Suppose you meet a friend you 
haven’t seen for a long time. At one point in the conversation you ask 
him “so are you seeing anyone?”. He responds: “yes, and her eyes are 
so beautiful”. You ask “what color are they?”, to which he replies: “my 
favorite color”. Now if you take his word for it, then you know a certain 
proposition: my friend’s lover’s eyes are is favorite color. But suppose 
you have no idea who his new lover is, nor his favorite color. Under this 
scenario though you would know that the sentence “my friend’s lover’s 
eyes are his favorite color” expresses a truth, you would not know the 
fact that makes it true. The sentence refers to a fact which involves a 
certain woman’s eyes being a certain color. If Sue is the lover in ques-
tion, and your friend’s favorite color is brown, then the fact in question 
would be Sue’s eyes being brown. You know that the sentence expresses 
a truth, but you do not know the fact to which it refers.
When you know a truth but you are ignorant about the fact that 
makes it true, this could at times arouse your curiosity. In the previous 
case for instance you may be curious about who your friend’s lover is, 
or you may be curious about what your friend’s favorite color is, but you 
could also be curious about the fact in question. Interestingly there is 
no standard way to pose your curiosity of a fact in the form of a ques-
tion. Perhaps we may use something like the Spanish model to convert 
the full declarative sentence into an interrogative with a high pitch at 
the end (or by putting a question mark in written form): “your lover’s 
eyes are your favorite color?” Here your intention is not to ask a wheth-
er-question given that you already know that the sentence expresses 
a truth. Though this way of asking a question sounds highly artifi cial, 
there are contexts in which we do raise such questions. Suppose your 
conversation with your friend continues like this:
 You: Who is your lover?
 Him: In fact, you know her.
 You: I know her?
Here your fi nal utterance does not have to be an exclamation that ex-
presses your surprise. It also does not have to be expressing doubt about 
whether what he says is true. It may be taken purely as a question 
expressing curiosity. Note that the sentence “I know her” contains a 
pronoun that is inostensible for you in this context given that you do 
not know the person referred to by it. The full sentence then expresses a 
truth, but what you are curious about is not whether it is true, but rath-
er the fact that makes it true. Once again this would be a case in which 
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you have merely inostensible knowledge of a proposition; you would 
know that the sentence refers to a fact, but you would not know the fact.
So now we are in a position to distinguish between two kinds of 
propositional ignorance depending on which kind of propositional 
knowledge one lacks. If one lacks inostensible knowledge of a proposi-
tion, then one lacks knowledge period, and that is the typical kind of 
ignorance. Given that this is ignorance concerning the truth of a propo-
sition let us call it “truth-ignorance”. When one acquires knowledge of 
a proposition, then truth-ignorance is eliminated, (or at least reduced). 
One may however still be ignorant about the fact that makes the propo-
sition true. Let us call this “fact-ignorance.” When one acquires merely 
inostensible knowledge of a proposition, one is not truth-ignorant any-
more, but one is still fact-ignorant.
The philosophical signifi cance of distinguishing between these two 
types of ignorance becomes more evident when we come to realize that 
fi nding a correct answer to a wh-question does not always fully elimi-
nate our ignorance. If you ask “who won the race?”, and you get the 
reply “the fastest man on earth”, you would not be satisfi ed if you do 
not know who the fastest man on earth is.10 Though the answer may be 
a correct answer to the question, it will not eliminate your ignorance 
concerning the fact in question. Tough you would know a certain truth 
you would not know the fact that makes it true, if you do not know who 
the fastest man one earth is—which makes the description inosten-
sible in your idiolect. When a part of a sentence is inostensible then 
the whole sentence will also be inostensible. Even if you know that the 
sentence expresses a truth, you would not know the fact to which it 
refers. You would know that the man who won the race is the fastest 
man on earth, though you would not know the fact which makes it true. 
If unbeknownst to you Bolt is the fastest man, then you would still be 
ignorant of the fact that he won the race. This does not imply that once 
you come to know the proposition that Bolt won the race your ignorance 
will be eliminated. If you know nothing about Bolt and have never even 
heard of his name before, then merely acquiring the knowledge that 
Bolt won the race does not put you in close epistemic contact with that 
fact. Consider the famous Unabomber-case. After several instances of 
explosions of bombs mailed to certain university and airline offi ces, the 
FBI gave the name “the Unabomber” (shorthand for the university and 
airline bomber) for the suspect. Before he was caught the Unabomber 
kept sending new bombs, and after each case the FBI was able to con-
clude from the peculiar ways in which the bombs were manufactured 
that it was the Unabomber who was responsible. In those cases, though 
the police knew that the Unabomber had sent the bomb, they did not 
know the fact that makes it true, given that they did not know who 
10 The example is due to Hand (1988). By appealing to Hintikka’s notion of 
epistemically relativized-rigidity Hand argues that “the fastest man on earth” does 
not answer the question when it is not epistemically rigid for the asker. See my 
(2012: 114–116) for a discussion of why such an account fails.
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the Unabomber was. When the name “the Unabomber” is inostensible, 
then every sentence in which it appears would be insotensible, even for 
ones who know that the sentence in questions expresses a truth. The 
police were not ignorant about the truth of the proposition in question, 
though they were ignorant of the fact that makes that proposition true.
You may know that the 98th prime is not divisible by 3, but that does 
not imply that you know what the 98th prime number is, and if you are 
ignorant of this, then you are ignorant of a certain mathematical fact.11 
If you introduced a name for this number, say “P98”, you could claim 
to know that P98 is not divisible by 3, but that would not put you in 
epistemic contact with this fact. One reason why our ignorance of facts 
goes unnoticed is because at times when we learn the standard name 
of a person or a city, or some object as such, we get a false sense of 
acquaintance. If you ask “what is the capital of Rwanda?” and get the 
answer “it is Kigali”, you could thereby eliminate your truth-ignorance, 
but if you still know nothing else about this city, you could still be igno-
rant of the fact of Kigali’s being the capital of Rwanda. A Kigali native 
would certainly know this fact much better than you do given their 
acquaintance with this city. If Mary spends all her life in a black and 
white room, and learns many truths about the color blue, she may come 
to know that the sky on a clear sunny day is blue, though she would 
not know the fact that makes it true.12 All her propositional knowledge 
about the color blue would be inostensible, that is why when she is re-
leased from her room and observes the sky for the fi rst time she learns 
something new and eliminates her ignorance of this fact.
V.
The distinction between ostensible and inostensible knowledge is one 
that allows for degrees making propositional knowledge gradable, an 
idea that has not been welcomed by philosophers in general. For every 
case in which an agent knows a proposition we may talk about the 
degree of the agent’s epistemic connection to the fact that makes the 
proposition true. Just like one’s knowledge of an object may come in de-
grees, their knowledge of a fact concerning an object’s having a certain 
property, or an object’s having a certain relation to another object may 
also come in degrees.13 At one end of the scale we may have complete 
11 The example is due to Keith Donnellan (1979) though he makes use of it 
for a different—though not completely unrelated—purpose. For a detailed critical 
discussion of Donnellan on the de re/de dicto distinction and his arguments against 
Kripke’s (1972) contingent a priori argument see Inan (2012) especially Chapter 12: 
Limits of Curiosity and Its Satisfaction.
12 As most readers would know this example is from a famous thought experiment 
due to Frank Jackson (1982), which he makes use of to argue against physicalism. 
Though I am inclined to believe that Jackson’s argument is fallacious, his thought 
experiment is nonetheless philosophically interesting which could be used for 
purposes other than his own.
13 For every term in our idiolect, including full sentences, we may talk about 
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ostensibilty, which would be the case when an agent has infallible jus-
tifi cation for the truth of the proposition and is therefore certain that 
the fact in question exists, and also has complete acquaintance with all 
of its constituents. This is something we rarely achieve, fi rst because 
our justifi cation for the truth of a proposition seldom gives us the right 
to be certain about it, and secondly, it is almost never the case that we 
have full acquaintance with the constituents of the fact that makes 
a proposition true, even when we know with complete certainty that 
the proposition is true. The closer we are to the inostensible end of the 
scale, the more room there will be for curiosity. So it follows that know-
ing that you do not know whether a proposition is true is not the only 
form of awareness of ignorance, for your degree of acquaintance of the 
fact that makes that proposition true may be low enough for you to be-
come aware that you are, to some extent, ignorant of that fact. Aware-
ness of ignorance then is also a gradable notion. All along just to ease 
the discussion I have taken the liberty to talk about the elimination of 
ignorance as if it is an all or nothing affair. When we consider the facts 
about the world that we claim to know we shall soon realize that our 
knowledge of the constituent objects and properties of those facts is far 
from being complete. A complete elimination of our ignorance concern-
ing a substantial fact rarely takes place, if at all. We should then admit 
that the more experience we gain about the facts of the world, our igno-
rance is reduced, but almost never completely eliminated. The best we 
can do is to attempt to make our propositions and the concepts within 
them to become more ostensible. Awareness of ignorance, whether it is 
objectual of propositional, can then always be translated into an aware-
ness of inostensibility. For every instance of objectual ignorance there 
will always be a singular term, which is not a full sentence, whose 
referent is unknown to the agent making that singular term inosten-
sible in the idiolect of the agent. Propositional ignorance comes in two 
different varieties, truth-ignorance and fact-ignorance. In the former 
case there is a full sentence s whose truth value is unknown to the 
agent, making it inostensible; awareness of this form ignorance then 
can always be translated into an awareness of the inostensibility of a 
defi nite description: “the truth-value of s”. When an agent knows that 
a sentence expresses a truth but does not know the fact that makes it 
true, the sentence in question is again inostensible given that the agent 
does not know the fact to which the sentence refers. All in all, for every 
kind of awareness of ignorance there will always be a linguistic term 
whose inostensibility the agent is aware of. This goes to show that the 
acquisition of the knowledge of truths, even when it is accompanied 
with complete certainty, cannot be the ultimate goal of inquiry.
its “degree of ostensibility”. See Inan (2014) for a more elaborate discussion of this 
notion.
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